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POVERTY AND POPULATION: NUMBERS, RATES OF CHANGE, 
DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS, POLICIES
(Annotated Lecture Outline)
Reginald Herbold Green
I. POPULATION -  SOME QUESTIONS OF NUMBERS, CHANGES. 
A. Absolute
1. Economies of scale for central government, security, foreign relations, 
markets/marketing.
2. Perhaps crucial up to 5 to 10 million population low-income and 1 to 2.5 million for 
middle-income countries. Not so relevant rich (e.g. Luxembourg).
3. Limits to what can be done in respect to island mini-countries but even there 
regionalism and confederation or federation could have uses.
4. Raising population as direct ‘solution’ usually implausible (consider Lesotho).
B. Per Hectare or Per Useable Hectare
1. Per Hectare unhelpful - % useless, marginal or low intensity use land varies wildly -  
very high Botswana, high Tanzania, low Swaziland, very low Mauritius.
2. Per useable hectare only meaningful in context of overall natural resources, 
technology, capital, knowledge, labour force quality (per capita levels and changes).
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3. There are real land/resource/state revenue (for services) constraints when little (or 
negative) change in capital, technology, knowledge, quality of labour force. FAO 
estimates half of African countries are above optimal person/land ratio given 
technology/capital availability. Rwanda, Burundi exemplify dangers of land scarcity 
in a polarised/antagonistic socio-political context. (The same result can flow even 
where useable land is not scarce overall; if  very uneven ratios and land short, while 
people cannot in practice move to land surplus areas.)
4. If not facing very serious para 2/3 constraints, may be economies of scale/density of 
use to basic services, transport and communications, commerce. However, again 
deliberate pro-natalism to secure these is unlikely to be a sound strategy. Pursuing 
general poverty reduction and growth promotion together with lower death rates and 
higher security (disaster and old age) would normally be a superior one.
C. Population Growth: Some Considerations.
1. Population growth (independent of total numbers/initial resource ratios) raises 
education, health, safety net costs per capita. With public consumption (where these 
largely fall), the most depressed (and in many cases still falling) sector in SSA, this is 
a strong reason to see such rates as detrimental to high sustainable output growth 
under present circumstances.
2. Net population growth rates with high infant and under-5 mortality and high 
proportions o f the population trapped in disaster (general or household) and old age 
insecurity are much more costly (to output growth and to poverty reduction) than with 
low mortality, high basic service access and moderate to low insecurity. In practice, 
(logically and historically) these shifts tend to reduce not only gross, but also net, 
population growth.
3. Demographically high proportions of pre and post workforce population (as well as of 
persons structurally marginalised in respect to livelihood) are costly. The low or
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negative population growth, rapid aging scenario is, however, not relevant in SSA 
today even if it is in the North.
II. GLOBALISATION, DISCOURSE AND ALL THAT
A. Globalisation and Liberalisation over the past 50 and especially the past 15 years
have moved unevenly:
1. Goods -  high and rising.
2. Most services -  moderate and rising.
3. Capital -  moderate and rising (with inadequate risk management, institutional 
infrastructure and safeguards as 1997-99 has demonstrated).
4. Knowledge -  high, rising but very uneven.
5. Highly qualified labour -  fairly high and increasing.
6. Medium qualified labour -  uneven and probably static overall, e.g. nurses are a 
growth area because o f Northern shortages, as are information technology skilled 
personnel because of specific Northern shortages and relatively high transferability of 
skills. For the South African mines, middle-level labour force migrant opportunities 
are in rapid decline (especially for new entrants) for structural reasons.
7. Low qualified labour -  low, insecure, probably falling e.g. German industrial 
guestworkers, especially since reunification (Easterners substitute for Turks/Kurds). 
The only exceptions are in posts rich country nationals will not take up.
B. Migrant Labour/Emigration are simply not viable genreal optoins.
1. There may be niche cases for established providers with large external 
employment/remittance flows, but these are not readily available to new entrants.
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2. The countries with high remittances to domestic output ratios are not in general 
among the poorest, in low personal consumption terms. Somaliland, Somalia, the 
Maldives, Turkey, Portugal, Lebanon and even Lesotho are not, and the Philippines 
and Cape Verde are not particularly low in basic service access either. Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Senegal, Sudan are very poor and to a large extent their migrants are low-skill 
and highly vulnerable to squeezing out both in Europe and in their neighbours.
3. Even in the niche countries, the poorest are heavily under-represented in migrant 
workers and the more qualified over-represented, e.g. Pilipina domestic workers in 
Hong Kong (150,000) often have university degrees and teaching or nursing 
qualifications and rarely less than secondary education plus fluent English, and are 
hired (and paid well above HK unskilled wages) precisely for those reasons. Pilipina 
nurses to the USA and UK -  and South African in lesser numbers and more recently -  
usually have transferable world-level qualifications.
4. Therefore, increased overseas work take-up is likely to prejudice growth and poverty 
reduction (useful as it is to average consumption and crucial as it is to main recipient 
households). This can be offset if public sector strategy or enterprise sector market 
response result in flows of specific groups of qualified personnel above national 
effective demand as is the case for nurses in the Philippines. (Effective demand -  not 
need. The Philippines would have better health services with more nurses but even at 
$250 a month ‘cannot afford’ them and at $7,500 the cost o f an international-level 
qualification is viable to a household only if the recipient does work abroad and remit 
steadily for several years.)
5. Neither emigration nor overseas working, therefore, can usually make much 
contribution to poverty reduction nor be central to population policy.
6. Dialogue between (predominantly though increasingly less so) European advocates of 
family planning/child spacing and African pro-natalists have at least in the past 
tended to be dialogues (or diatribes) of the deaf. Analysis and contextual action to 
allow choice of control over complete family size has frequently been notably 
attenuated or even absent.
4
7. While some apostles of family planning do appear to suffer from out o f context, 
unidirectional enthusiasm, and much Northern support is clearly subliminally (or 
even overtly) racist, that is a poor reason for angrily declaiming mirror image pro 
natalism. Africans (not least African women) should enter into exploration and 
dialogue as to what is in their interests and how it might be accomplished whatever 
outsiders assert and for whatever reasons..
III. STRATEGIC POLICY ELEMENTS: CONTEXTUAL AND DIRECT
1. Reducing infant and child mortality. Where high and uncertain these lend to high 
gross birth rates and usually to high net population growth rates.
2. Increasing access to waged employment and to education (which reduce the 
current economic gains from and increase the costs of children). Women’s education 
at or beyond complete primary reduces birthrates apparently by increasing knowledge 
and status.
3. Reducing disaster and old-age dependence on children (preferably several so at 
least one has a significant income) e.g. by drought, illness safety nets and universal 
and state old-age pensions (where fiscally feasible as in South Africa, Namibia, 
Mauritius, Botswana) as well as employment tied unemployment and retirement
schemes.
4. Universal access to primary education, basic health services, nearly pure water, 
reduction of exclusion or marginalisation of women plus higher household income 
growth and better short (trampoline) and long term safety nets are relevant. They are 
also desirable whatever the desired complete household size (of individual 
households or nationally) and -  with the exception of reducing some aspects of 
gender inequality -  likely to be poor-household popular and politically profitable (at 
least in accountable polities with peaceful means to reject/remove unpopular/non­
performing political lenders).
5
5. Focussed action on prevention, alleviation/life extension and ‘cure’ (in both cases 
likely to be a vaccine or family o f vaccines) in respect of the largest -  malaria -  and 
most rapidly growing -  AIDS related -  causes of premature death. It is quite 
foolish to argue about which is more important -  both need to be tackled (even if the 
present balance does vary from country to country and zone to zone). Malaria is the 
leading child killer (and upholder o f the gross birth rate) and HIV/AIDS the leading 
destroyer of working-age adults (raising numbers of impoverished households, need 
for replacement family members and enhanced difficulty of achieving numerous 
surviving child security) are both poverty and gross birthrate expanding in wholly and 
grossly undesirable ways.
6. Direct population policy is secondary (at least in terms o f scale and cost) and 
complementary:
(i) education in support of child spacing/completed family size reduction;
(ii) access for child spacing/family planning advice and technology (including 
condoms which are a priority in any case because o f HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases) to meet existing demand in full and to expand at least at the 
same rate;
(iii) extension of child spacing/family planning education to men as well as to 
women (given the leading role of African men in most visible decisions, it is most 
unlikely there is complete female dominance of decision-taking in the bedroom — 
indeed women’s testimonies tend to confirm the reverse). “Just say no” is as 
useful advice to women desiring to limit completed family size and to space 
children as it is to potential drug users facing peer pressure and tensions generated 
by a closed, dead-end hostile world.
The direct actions are important but consequential on and complementary to the 
indirect which can create a climate/environment/demand for family planning by more 
-  and especially more poor -  households. By themselves they are unlikely to have 
much impact.
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7. The assertion that “Africa is different” and unlikely to experience a demographic 
transition to lower birth rates is out of date. The transition is now clearly discernible 
in many (not all countries) and began in the 1980s (or even 1970s). It can be expected 
to continue except where past (e.g. postwar baby booms) or present (e.g. HIV 
epidemic) upsurges in loss of family members lead to a replacement response.
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